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UNOPENED PUBLIC STREET EASEMENTS IN
WASHINGTON: WHOSE RIGHT TO USE THAT LAND IS
IT, ANYWAY?
Alfred E. Donohue
Abstract: This Comment argues that landowners whose property abuts unopened public
street easements have a right to reasonable, non-interfering use of such easements until the
city or county opens the street for its intended purpose. Unopened public street easements are
dedicated streets that a city or county has not developed or used. Often, landowners use this
land to store firewood, park boats, or garden. In 1995, the City of Seattle enacted Municipal
Code section 15.02.100, which prohibits all use of unopened public street easements. Several
Washington court decisions purportedly support the Seattle ordinance. These decisions
suggest that abutting property owners have no legal right to use unopened streets absent
permission from the city. However, other Washington court decisions have held that abutting
property owners have a right to reasonable, non-interfering use of unopened streets. Under
these decisions, this right of use continues until the city or county uses the street for its
intended purpose. Other major Washington cities follow this rule. In 1999, the Washington
Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the conflicting decisions but was unable to resolve
the issue satisfactorily. This Comment argues that courts and municipalities have mis-
construed cases purporting to prohibit all use by the abutting landowner and that an abutting
landowner may make reasonable non-interfering use of an unopened street easement.
"The right of an owner of land abutting on public highways has
been afruitful source of litigation in the courts of all the states, and
the decisions have been conflicting, and often in the same state
irreconcilable in principle. "1
Throughout Washington, public easements burden a significant
amount of land.2 They give the city or county the right to construct a
street at any time, but until the city or county actually does so, the land
remains unused. For example, two Seattle neighborhoods, Magnolia and
Queen Anne, have numerous unopened, unused, and unimproved public
street easements.3 These easements total more than 21,000 linear feet in
1. Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536,548 (1907).
2. A right of way, or easement, is a right of use over the property of another. WILLIAM B.
STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 435 (3d ed. 2000). A public right of way,
or public easement, gives the general public an easement for passage on public streets and highways.
See Motoramp Garage Co. v. City of Tacoma, 136 Wash. 589, 591, 241 P. 16, 17 (1925).
3. A public street easement is a dedication to a county or city of specific land for use as a street.
See State ex rel. York v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d 891,904, 184 P.2d 577, 585 (1947).
A street is opened when the county or municipality uses the street for travel or transportation. See
Karb v. City of Bellingham, 61 Wash. 2d 214,217,377 P.2d 984,985-86 (1963).
Washington Law Review Vol. 76:541, 2001
these two neighborhoods alone. 4 This amounts to more than 650,000
square feet of unopened public street easements, or nearly fifteen acres of
land in two of Seattle's most expensive neighborhoods.'
This Comment examines who has the right to use these unopened
public street easements until a street is built. Washington court decisions
are not consistent regarding the use of unopened public street easements,
and two contradictory views have developed.6 The first line of decisions
treats unopened public street easements akin to private easements.' The
abutting landowner8 may use the area covered by an easement in any
reasonable way that does not interfere with the easement holder's rights.9
However, the abutting landowner's use may neither interfere with the
opening of the street by the city or county"° nor with the right of
neighboring landowners to use the unopened street for access to their
own property when necessary.1 In contrast, the second line of decisions
indicates that abutting landowners 2 have no right to use an unopened
public street easement, other than for access, light, air, and view.'3
Amidst this confusion, some cities have enacted ordinances that
restrict use by abutting landowners. For example, Seattle and Bellevue
both expressly prohibit the use of unopened public street easements
4. These figures are based on site surveys and examination of street maps by the author (Aug. 21-
23, 2000) (maps available at Kroll Map Co.).
5. Based on site surveys and examination of street maps by the author, (Aug. 21-23, 2000),
Magnolia and Queen Anne comprise less than ten percent of Seattle's total residential area.
According to a Building Industry Association of Washington officer, there are substantial dedicated
but unopened and unused streets statewide. Interview with Kenneth Donohue, past President,
Building Industry Association of Washington, in Olympia, Wash. (Sept. 12, 2000).
6. Compare Baxter-WyckoffCo. v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555,408 P.2d 1012 (1965), with
Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792, 375 P.2d 863 (1962).
7. See Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865; Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397,
407-08,367 P.2d 798, 803 (1962).
8. For the purposes of this Comment, an abutting landowner is the party that owns the land
burdened by the easement.
9. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865 (permitting planting of shrubs and trees, and
extension of garage); Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 407-09, 367 P.2d at 803-04 (permitting concrete
slab, parking cars, "or other appropriate use"); Holm v. Montgomery, 62 Wash. 398, 400, 113 P.
1115, 1116 (1911) (permitting irrigation ditch). However, building a garage, an addition to a house,
or a cement retaining wall on the easement might be unreasonable. See Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at
409, 367 P.2d at 804.
10. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865.
11. Id.
12. Kemp v. City of Seattle, 149 Wash. 197, 201, 270 P. 431, 433 (1928) (explaining that
property abuts street when there is no intervening land between it and street).
13. Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555, 562, 408 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1965)
(noting access, light, air, and view as street purposes).
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without the city's permission. 4 Others cities, such as Vancouver and
Everett, allow reasonable use of unopened public street easements by an
abutting landowner, provided the use does not interfere with the city's
use and is not commercial.' s
This Comment first explains unopened public street easements and
their creation. Next, it examines the two conflicting lines of case law
addressing the right of abutting owners to use these easements without
first obtaining a permit. This Comment continues by examining various
municipal ordinances, some of which, such as Seattle Municipal Code
(SMC) section 15.02.100, prohibit any use of unopened easements. This
Comment then argues that the legal premises for ordinances such as
Seattle's are invalid because the "no use"' cases do not apply to the
reasonable use of an unopened public street easement. Further, con-
straining all reasonable use by abutting landowners excessively restricts
the rights of landowners to use their property. Such exclusions run
counter to public policy favoring the efficient use of land. This Comment
concludes that Washington case law, properly read, mandates that
abutting owners may make non-interfering use 6 of unopened public
street easements.
I. CREATION AND OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC STREET
EASEMENTS
This Part first discusses the creation, opening, and extinguishing of
public street easements. Next, it explains who owns the land over which
the public street easement runs. Finally, it details the specific rights of
use that the general public, neighboring owners, and abutting landowners
have in public street easements.
14. See, e.g., SEATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.02.100 (1998); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY
CODE§ 14.30.080 (1998).
15. See, e.g., VANCOUVER, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.60.050 (1998); EVERETr, WASH.,
MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 13.30.040, 13.84.010 (1998).
16. For the purposes ofthis Comment, non-interfering use is any use ofan unopened public street
easement that will not prevent a city, county, or other party from later using the easement. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397,408,367 P.2d 798, 803-04 (1962).
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A. Creating, Opening, and Extinguishing a Public Street Easement
An easement is one person's17 right to make some limited use of land
owned by another person. 18 The dominant owner is the party who holds
the easement, while the servient landowner is the person who owns the
property burdened by the easement. 9 The dominant owner's right to use
the land exists whether or not the easement is improved and opened.2"
For example, when a landowner grants an easement for a driveway, that
easement exists even though the driveway has not yet been built. Until
the dominant owner constructs the driveway, the easement remains
unopened and unimproved.2
When a landowner dedicates an easement to the public for use as a
street, the landowner creates a public street easement.22 These dedica-
tions, known as statutory dedications, occur when a landowner grants the
governmental body a deed or when a city or county approves a plat that
marks the location of streets dedicated to public use.23 A landowner may
dedicate previously platted land for a street, provided the landowner
follows the procedures set forth by the city or county.24 This later
17. For the purposes of this Comment, a person is any owner of property, including an individual
or corporation.
18. City of Olympia v. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d 225, 229, 728 P.2d 135, 137 (1986). An easement
holder, the dominant owner, is entitled to only limited use of the fee owner's, the servient owner's,
property. See State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash. 2d 487, 494, 156 P.2d 667, 671
(1945).
19. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW, in WASHINGTON PRACTICE, 84
(1995).
20. An improved street is any street where the municipality or county has made improvements to
provide for any primary use, such as grading or paving. See Albee v. Town of Yarrow Point, 74
Wash. 2d 453, 458-59, 445 P.2d 340, 344 (1968). An opened street is one where there is any
primary or secondary use by a city or county; for example, laying a sidewalk opens a street, because
transportation is a primary use. See State ex rel. York v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d 89 1,
904, 184 P.2d 577, 585 (1947). Likewise, a municipality laying gas, water, or power lines along an
unimproved right of way opens it because the governmental agency has used the street easement for
secondary uses. See id.
21. Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 407-08, 367 P.2d at 803.
22. Loose v. Locke, 25 Wash. 2d 599, 604, 171 P.2d 849, 852 (1946).
23. See Karb v. City of Bellingham, 61 Wash. 2d 214, 217, 377 P.2d 984, 985-86 (1963). A plat
map is a representation outlining streets and property lines. See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.020
(2000); see also Neighbors & Friends of Viretta Park v. Miller, 87 Wash. App. 361, 366, 940 P.2d
286, 289 (1997).
24. See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.215. See also generally id. §§ 58.08.050, 58.17.033.
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dedication of a public street need not be accepted by any public authority
to have statutory effect.S
A county or municipality opens a public street easement when it uses
the street for any legal purpose.26 This use may be either primary or
secondary.27 Primary uses relate to travel over the street, while secondary
uses are incident to travel and commerce, such as utility lines and street
railways.2' For example, if a city constructs a sidewalk or gravel road, the
street easement is opened for its primary use.29 In contrast, if the city lays
a sewer line or runs utility lines along the street easement, the street is
open for a secondary use.30 Until a city or county uses the street easement
in any or all of these manners, it remains unopened and exists only on
paper.
Nevertheless, a public street easement exists even if it remains
unopened, unused, or unimproved.3' Some street easements are not
opened because they lie on steep slopes that make improvement
impractical.32 Others are not opened because adequate access to abutting
properties exists, making development of streets unnecessary and
financially wasteful.33 Further, if a street easement continues through a
ravine, creek, or other physical impediment, the improved street may end
at the impediment while the unimproved easement or "paper street"
continues.34
25. Loose, 25 Wash. 2d at 604, 171 P.2d at 852. In addition to statutory dedication, "common law
dedications" are unrecorded public street easements created by implication or estoppel. See
McConiga v. Riches, 40 Wash. App. 532, 537, 700 P.2d 331, 336 (1985). In this Comment, for
uniformity, all references to easements assume a statutory grant is the basis for the dedication.
26. Motorarnp Garage Co. v. City of Tacoma, 136 Wash. 589, 591-92, 241 P. 16, 17 (1925)
(listing permissible and impermissible uses).





31. See Erickson Bushling, Inc. v. Manke Lumber Co., 77 Wash. App. 495, 499, 891 P.2d 750,
752 (1995).
32. See Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 164,443 P.2d 833, 836 (1968).
33. See Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792,793,375 P.2d 863, 864 (1962).
34. See Finch, 74 Wash. 2d at 164,443 P.2d at 836 (explaining that unopened street ran through
ravine and was unimprovable).
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A municipality or county may lose a public street easement only by
relinquishing the easement.35 Mere non-use will not extinguish a public
or private easement. 36 Equitable estoppel arises when a party's prior
conduct is inconsistent with a claim the party later asserts.37 For example,
if a city is aware an individual is building a house on an unopened street
easement and does nothing, a court may equitably estop the city from
requiring the house's removal. 38 Washington courts do not favor extin-
guishment of a public easement by equitable estoppel, although cases
exist in which courts have applied the doctrine.39
B. Ownership ofLand Underlying Public Easements
In Washington, a landowner generally holds fee simple title 40 to the
center of the street abutting4' the landowner's property.42 This fee simple
title is subject to the dedicated street easement, which gives a city or
county the right to use the street easement.43 This easement gives the city
or county superior rights of use, but title to the land remains in the hands
of the abutting landowner.44 The chain of fee title runs back to the party
who originally dedicated the street.45 If the easement is eliminated by
35. Adverse possession cannot run against a public easement. Erickson Bushling, 77 Wash. App.
at 497, 891 P.2d at 752 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.090 (1994), preventing adverse possession
against municipalities, counties, or state).
36. McAdam v. Benson Logging & Lumbering Co., 57 Wash. 407, 409, 107 P. 187, 187 (1910).
37. Equitable estoppel occurs when a party makes admissions or acts inconsistent with a later
claim, and an injury to another party relying on that admission or act would occur if that later
inconsistent claim were allowed. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wash. 2d 29, 35, 1 P.3d 1124, 1128
(2000).
38. See P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel Against Government
and Its Governmental Agencies, I A.L.R.2d 338, 340-41 (1948).
39. Finch, 74 Wash. 2d at 171, 443 P.2d at 839-40; City of Seattle v. P.B. Inv. Co., 11 Wash.
App. 653, 663, 524 P.2d 419, 426 (1974).
40. In Washington, a conveyance of property without qualification conveys to the tranferee fee
simple title. See WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.060 (2000); see also STOEBUCK, supra note 19, at 4-5.
41. Kemp v. City of Seattle, 149 Wash. 197, 201, 270 P. 431, 433 (1928) (explaining that
property abuts street when there is no intervening land between it and street).
42. Burmeister v. Howard, I Wash. Terr. 207, 211 (1867) ("[W]hen an easement is taken as a
public highway, the soil and freehold remain in the owner of the land encumbered only with the right
of passage in the public."). Washington courts have followed this rule without exception. E.g.,
Rainier Ave. Corp. v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 362, 366,494 P.2d 996, 998 (1972); Puget Sound
Alumni of Kappa Sigma, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 222, 226, 422 P.2d 799, 802 (1967).
43. 11 EUGENE MCQUILLN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 3 (1991) (explaining that underlying
owners must yield to municipality or county).
44. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
45. See Rainier Ave., 80 Wash. 2d at 366, 494 P.2d at 998.
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vacation,46 the exclusive right to use the property vests in the abutting
landowners.47 Moreover, unless the original dedicator reserves the fee in
the street, the fee runs with the abutting property when the owner
subsequently sells the property.48
However, several exceptions to this general rule exist.49 For example,
a city may own the fee to a street.50 Another exception may arise when a
street borders two separate plats dedicated by two parties. 5' In this
instance, one of the original dedicators may have originally conveyed the
entire street easement, thus retaining the fee to the entire street. 2
C. Rights of Use in Open Public Street Easements
Washington courts have traditionally classified rights to use open
public street easements in three categories. First, the general public has
the right to use open public streets regardless of where these members of
the public live. 3 This right extends to all reasonable travel and
communication of persons and movement of property over the public
street easement. 4 This right is granted through public dedication and
manifests itself when the city or county opens the street.55 Thus, until the
city or county opens the public street easement, the public has no right to
use the easement. 6 However, once the street is opened, the public has the
full right to use the street.
46. "Vacation" is defined as the elimination of the easement from the underlying land by
ordinance or judicial decree. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.79.010 (2000).
47. Id. § 35.79.040; Puget Sound Alumni, 70 Wash. 2d at 226,422 P.2d at 802.
48. Bradley v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 79 Wash. 455,458, 140 P. 688, 689 (1914).
49. This Comment assumes that the general principle of fee simple ownership applies.
50. For example, Seattle has owned fee simple title to Lake Washington Boulevard since 1913.
See Martin v. City of Seattle, 11 Wash. 2d 727, 730,765 P.2d 257, 258 (1988).
51. See Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267, 271, 128 P. 539, 541 (1912) (holding that deed carries title
to farthest side of highway if easement is located wholly on grantor's land).
52. Id.
53. Yarrow First Assocs. v. Town of Clyde Hill, 66 Wash. 2d 371, 375-76, 403 P.2d 49, 53
(1965).
54. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 43, at 3 (citing Yarrow First Assocs., 66 Wash. 2d 371,403 P.2d
49).
55. See 10A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 371 (3d ed. 1949); see also Moore
v. City of Lawrence, 654 P.2d 445, 453 (Kan. 1982).
56. See Erickson Bushling Inc. v. Manke Lumber Co., 77 Wash. App. 495, 499, 891 P.2d 750,
752-53 (1995).
57. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 43, at 3.
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Second, neighboring landowners 8 have special rights arising out of
property ownership. 9 Whether the street easement is open or unopened,
neighboring owner rights include access, air, light, and view.' Even if a
street abutting their property is unopened, closed, or vacated,
neighboring owners may maintain a private easement to access their
property, known as "easement implied from plat.,,6' However, a
neighboring owner may only use an unopened public street easement if
that use is necessary for access to and from the owner's property.62
Third, the abutting landowner's rights to use the street easement
abutting their properties are greater still than neighboring landowners
are.63 An abutting landowner generally holds title to the portion of the
public street easement underlying the landowner's property. 64 Courts
have recognized that abutting landowners have a special right to use the
opened street abutting their properties.6  In Fry v. O'Leary, 6 the court
recognized that 'the rights which an abutting owner of abutting property
possesses in a street are different in kind from that possessed by [the
general public]."' 67 However, the degree and nature of an abutting
landowner's use is less clear when the street is unopened. 8
58. For the purposes of this Comment, a neighboring owner is one whose property does not abut
the particular street or portion of street an abutting owner holds title to, but rather is in the general
vicinity of the property. The neighboring owner owns property in the same plat or subdivision and
has special rights to all streets in that area. STOEBUCK, supra note 19, at 95.
59. 1 0A McQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 355 (citing Shaw v. City of Yakima, 183 Wash. 200, 48
P.2d 630 (1935)).
60. Id.; see also Denman v. City ofTacoma, 148 Wash. 314, 320, 268 P. 1043, 1045 (1928).
61. Denman, 148 Wash. at 320, 268 P. at 1045; see also IOA MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 355.
62. See Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792, 795, 375 P.2d 863, 865 (1962) (concluding that
use of unopened street not necessary for neighbor's access).
63. Humphrey v. Krutz, 77 Wash. 152, 155, 137 P. 806, 807 (1913) (holding that abutting owner
has both public rights in common with everyone and private rights arising from ownership of
contiguous property).
64. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
65. James v. Burchett, 15 Wash. 2d 119, 123, 129 P.2d 790, 792 (1942) (stating that owners of
lots bordering streets or ways have right to make reasonable use of street for convenience of their
lots, not inconsistent with public's right to use entire street); 1 OA McQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 355.
66. 141 Wash. 465, 252 P. 111 (1927).
67. Id. at 471, 252 P. at 113 (quoting Smith v. Centralia, 55 Wash. 573, 104 P. 797 (1909)).
68. The general rule for opened private easements is that a servient landowner may make any use
of the area covered by the easement that does not interfere with the dominant owner's use. Long v.
Leonard, 191 Wash. 284, 295-96, 71 P.2d 1,6 (1937); STOEBUCK, supra note 19, at 113.
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II. USE OF UNOPENED PUBLIC STREET EASEMENTS
Although Washington courts have consistently construed the rights of
abutting landowners with respect to open public street easements, two
distinct lines of cases address the right of abutting owners with respect to
unopened public street easements. In the first line of cases, exemplified
by Nystrand v. O'Malley,69 courts focus on whether the use by the
abutting landowner interferes with the city's easement and whether the
city has opened the easement.7 ° If neither condition is satisfied, courts
allow abutting landowners "reasonable use" of the land over which the
easement runs, provided the use does not interfere with access of other
landowners.7' The second line of cases, based on Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v.
City of Seattle,72 suggests that, although abutting landowners hold
underlying title to the street, until the city vacates its street easement,
abutting landowners have no exclusive right of use.' Some municipal-
ities have used these cases to justify legislation strictly regulating all uses
of unopened public street easements.74 Others follow a reasonable-use
standard as applied by the Nystrand and Thompson v. Smith 5 courts.76
A. Cases Permitting an Abutting Landowner's Reasonable Use ofan
Unopened Public Street Easement
The Nystrand line of decisions treats unopened public street
easements similarly to private easements, permitting abutting landowners
reasonable use of the land.77 This right of reasonable use is subject to the
city or county opening the easement78 and neighboring landowner's right
69. 60 Wash. 2d 792,375 P.2d 863 (1962).
70. Id. at 795,375 P.2d at 865.
71. See Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397,407-08,367 P.2d 798,804-05 (1962).
72. 67 Wash. 2d 555, 408 P.2d 1012 (1965).
73. Id. at 560-61,408 P.2d at 1015-16.
74. See, e.g., SEATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 15.02.046, .048, .100 (1998) (prohibiting
any use of unopened streets by any party without permission).
75. 59 Wash. 2d 397,407-08,367 P.2d 798,804-05 (1962).
76. See, e.g., EVERETT, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.30.040 (1998) (allowing non-interfering
use of unopened street easements).
77. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865. The rule for unopened private easements is
similar to opened private easements in that the servient landowner is entitled to any use that does not
interfere with the dominant owner's use. Compare Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 407-08, 367 P.2d at
803 (unopened private easement), with Long v. Leonard, 191 Wash. 284, 296, 71 P.2d 1, 6 (1937)
(opened private easement).
78. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795,375 P.2d at 865.
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to use the unopened street for access. 79 However, if the municipality does
not open the street and neighboring owners do not need it for access,
these cases consistently hold that the abutting landowner may use the
land in any manner consistent with what an owner burdened by a private
easement might do with the land.8"
1. Nystrand v. O'Malley
In Nystrand v. O'Malley, the Washington Supreme Court held an
abutting landowner may use the portion of an unopened street easement
to which he or she holds fee title in any manner not inconsistent with the
easement." The Nystrand court employed a two-part analysis. First, the
court asked whether the use by the abutting owner was consistent with
the public's right to the easement.82 Second, the court examined whether
the use challenged interfered with other abutting property owners'
access.83 The court held that if both questions were answered negatively,
then the abutting landowner could make use of the portion of the
easement overlying his or her land.84
In Nystrand, a twelve-foot-wide unopened public street easement ran
directly in front of the Nystrand property." The Nystrands held the
underlying fee.86 Running parallel and abutting this right of way was a
second easement owned by Northern Pacific Railroad.87 A street that
provided access to the Nystrand and O'Malley properties lay on the
railroad easement.88 Both the Nystrands' and O'Malleys' driveways ran
across the twelve-foot unopened street easement to the street located on
the railroad easement.89 The Nystrands extended a garage onto the
unopened street, planted trees and hedges, and constructed a bulkhead. 90
79. Id.
80. Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 407-08, 367 P.2d at 803.
81. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. At least one unpublished Washington appellate decision makes reference to a "Nystrand
test." Sandpiper Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Gaylard, No. 41746-I-I, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 383, at
*5 (Mar. 1, 1999).
85. Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 793, 375 P.2d at 863-64.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 793, 375 P.2d at 864.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 795, 375 P.2d at 865.
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To improve access, the O'Malleys bulldozed an alternate route to their
house.9' This alternate route crossed the public street easement over the
Nystrand fee, and required removal of the bulkhead, trees, and hedge.92
When the Nystrands refused to remove the obstructions, the O'Malleys
bulldozed them.93 The Nystrands brought suit.94
The court rejected the O'Malleys' argument that the Nystrands
wrongfully encroached upon the public street easement.9 Because the
Nystrands owned the fee to the land underlying the easement where they
placed the bulkhead, trees, and hedges, the court determined that they
could use the land to which they held fee until their use interfered with
the city's use of the street easement.96 First, the court reasoned that the
Nystrands' use of the abutting unopened street was not inconsistent with
the public easement because the city had not asserted its right to open the
easement.97 Second, it found the Nystrands' use was not improper
because the unopened easement was not necessary for reasonable ingress
and egress to the O'Malleys' property.98 Accordingly, the court held the
Nystrands' use was proper."
2. Additional Cases Supporting an Abutting Owner's Reasonable Use
of an Unopened Street Easement
Many other Washington courts have applied a reasonable-use
standard. For example, the Washington Supreme Court applied the
standard in Thompson v. Smith, decided the same year as Nystrand. In
Thompson, Smith, the abutting landowner, constructed a concrete slab
over an unused portion of a private street easement.' Thompson, a
neighboring owner, sued to enjoin the use, claiming it interfered with the
easement.' The court concluded that, until Smith's use interfered with
Thompson's use of the easement, Smith did not need to remove the









100. 59 Wash. 2d 397,403,367 P.2d 798, 801(1962).
101. Id.
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concrete slab 1 2 because such use by the abutting landowner was
permitted."3 The court reasoned that such reasonable use must not
interfere with the dominant party's actual use of the easement."
Although Thompson involved a private easement, in dictum the court
extended the abutting owner's right of reasonable use, consistent with
Nystrand, to public easements.0 5 Furthermore, the court noted that when
possible, contemporaneous use by the underlying landowner not
inconsistent with the city or county's use was actually desirable. 0 6 The
Thompson court explained that although the city or county has the right
to use its easement for any use consistent with a pubic right of way, until
such use, the servient landowner has a right of reasonable use.,0 7 As
examples of consistent use, the court discussed two California cases.108
These cases found that neither the rights of a city possessing an easement
nor the abutting landowner's rights are absolute; instead, both the
individual property owner and the municipality's rights should be
interpreted to permit reasonable enjoyment by both parties as long as
mutual enjoyment is possible. 9 While the city's use of its easement is
superior to the rights of an abutting landowner, the Thompson court
reasoned that if the abutting landowner's use can coincide with the city's
use, then the private use is permissible.'" Therefore, until a city asserts
its rights by occupying and using the easement in some manner, non-
interfering use by the abutting landowner would be consistent with the
city's rights, provided that use does not encroach on the easement by
requiring substantial expense or effort for removal. "'
In addition, cases preceding Nystrand and Thompson support a right
of reasonable use by the abutting landowner, so long as the use does not
affect the rights of the city or county holding that easement. For example,
102. Id. at 407, 367 P.2d at 803.
103. Id. at 408-09, 367 P.2d at 804.
104. Id. at 407-08, 367 P.2d at 803.
105. Id. at 408-09, 367 P.2d at 803-04.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 407-08, 367 P.2d at 803.
108. The court cited two California cases applying "reasonable use" to public easements: City of
Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 110 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 194 1) and Colegrove
Water Co. v. City of Hollywood, 90 P. 1053, 1055 (Cal. 1907). Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 408-09,
367 P.2d at 803-04.
109. Thompson, 59 Wash. 2d at 408-09,367 P.2d at 803-04 (quoting Pasadena, 110 P. 2d at 987;
Colegrove, 90 P. at 1055).
110. Id.
11. Id. at 409, 367 P.2d at 804.
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in Holm v. Montgomery,"2 a neighboring landowner interfered with a
ditch in the unopened portion of the public street easement."3 The
abutting landowner sued to enjoin the use."4 The court, in ruling for the
abutting landowner, held that the owner of abutting property was allowed
to use land within the highway so long as the use did not interfere with
its use as a highway."' Because the use for ditches and drains was
outside the traveled portion, his use was proper." 6 Hence, the
respondent's interference with the abutting owner's use constituted a
trespass. The Washington Supreme Court subsequently applied this
standard of consistent use in Lanham v. Forney,"7 where the abutting
landowner had installed a pipe under an opened street.1" The city sued to
enjoin the use."9 The Washington Supreme Court cited to Holm and
Colegrove to support the proposition that unless the use by an abutting
landowner interfered with the public's actual use of the street, it was
permissible. 20
Recent Washington cases have reaffirmed the reasonable-use
standard. For example, in Meresse v. Stelma,'2' the Washington Court of
Appeals found that until a private easement holder used property for the
purpose reserved by the easement, the servient landowner could use the
land in any manner not interfering with the easement's proper
enjoyment.' Consistent with Thompson, the court held that this use is
qualified; thus, any use considered permanent" or requiring substantial
cost to remove is not permissible. 24
Similarly, in Sandpiper Condominium Ass' v. Gaylard,125 a recent
unpublished decision, the Washington Court of Appeals analyzed an
112. 62 Wash. 398, 113 P. 1115 (1911).
113. Id. at 399, 113 P. at 1116.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 400,113 P. at 1116.
116. Id.
117. 196 Wash. 62, 81 P.2d 777 (1938).
118. Id. at 65-66, 81 P.2d at 779.
119. Id. at 65, 81 P.2d at 778.
120. Id.
121. 100 Wash. App. 857, 999 P.2d 1267 (2000).
122. Id. at 867-68, 999 P.2d at 1274.
123. For the purpose of this Comment, "permanent uses" are those that might lead to equitable
estoppel. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
124. Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397, 409, 367 P.2d 798, 804 (1962).
125. Sandpiper Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Gaylard, No. 41746-1-1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 383
(Mar. 1, 1999).
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abutting landowner's use of an unopened public street easement.'26 In
Sandpiper, a landowner shared an unopened street end with a large
condominium.12 7 The condominium began to use the entire unopened
street easement for additional parking. 128 The other landowner then
constructed a fence extending to the centerline of the easement to
eliminate the condominium's use of the portion of the street easement
overlying their land. 19 Using a two-part "Nystrand test," the court
concluded that until a municipality opens a public street easement, the
abutting landowner has a right to reasonable use. 3' However, this right
of use is qualified by the other abutting landowners' need to access their
own property.'3 ' In applying this test, the court concluded that the fence
did not interfere with the city's use of the easement because the city had
not asserted its right to open the easement and that the abutting
landowner's fence did not interfere with the condominium's need for
reasonable access.
32
B. Cases Prohibiting an Abutting Landowner's Use of an Unopened
Public Street Easement Without Approval
Despite the historical application of the reasonable-use standard, a
distinct line of cases suggests an abutting landowner has no right to use
any public street easement other than for access, light, air, and view.'
33
These cases focus on a municipality's right to regulate any use of public
street easements. 134 Although a municipality or county may permit use by
the abutting landowner, it may also prohibit all uses. 135 Accordingly,
even though a city or county has not opened a public street easement,




130. Id. at *5. The abutting owner's need for access qualifies this right, along with the city's
assertion of the easement. Id.
131. Id. at *5-6.
132. Id.
133. Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555, 561, 408 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1965)
("The lack ofright of the abutting owner to use the street in front of his property does not depend on
his interference with an actual or proposed public use of the street. The abutting owner simply has no
legal right to make this kind of use of the dedicated public street.").
134. Id.
135. See Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. I v. Broadview Television Co., 91 Wash. 2d 3,
10-11,586 P.2d 851, 856 (1978); Baxter-Wyckqff, 67 Wash. 2d at 561, 408 P.2d at 1016.
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these cases suggest it still may control and dictate any use of the land
over which the easement runs. 1
36
1. Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v. City of Seattle
In Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v. City of Seattle,37 Seattle lumber mills
challenged the city's authority to charge fees for its continued permanent
use of an unopened public street easement.13 ' The mills leased the
property on both sides of the street and claimed the right to use the
street. 39 The street was dedicated in 1897 but never opened. 40 Before
1955, Baxter-Wyckoff and Nettleton had built several structures.' 4' In
1955, Seattle enacted an ordinance imposing fees for exclusive private
commercial use of unopened public street easements.1 42 In 1958, Baxter-
Wyckoff and Nettleton refused to pay any further fees and sued the city
to enjoin the collection of any fees. 43 They argued that because fee title
to an unopened street easement lies with the abutting landowner, the city
of Seattle could not charge fees that amounted to rent.'"
The Washington Supreme Court did not refer to Nystrand or the
Nystrand analysis, but only considered whether Baxter-Wyckoff and
Nettleton's "Permanent Encroachments Are Inconsistent with the
Public's Easement for Travel in Southwest Florida Street.' ' 145 The City of
Seattle argued that because streets were dedicated primarily for public
travel, secondary and subordinate uses were allowed only when they did
not interfere with public travel. 46 The court concluded: "The basic rule
applicable to this case is that there is no inherent right in a private
individual to conduct private business in the public streets."' 47 The court
reasoned that neither individuals nor municipalities may permanently
encroach on a street without a permit for private use.1 48 The court held
136. Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. 2d at 561,408 P.2d at 1016.
137. 67 Wash. 2d 555,408 P.2d 1012 (1965).
138. Id. at 557,408 P.2d at 1014.
139. Id. at 556-57, 408 P.2d at 1013-14.
140. Id. at 556, 408 P.2d at 1013.
141. Id. at 557, 408 P.2d at 1013.
142. Id. at 557, 408 P.2d at 1014.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 559, 408 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 560,408 P.2dat 1015.
148. Id. at 561,408 P.2dat 1016.
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the city could impose any terms and conditions it chose because the
permanent use of a street was a mere privilege, not a right. 49 To support
this conclusion, the court cited several cases allowing regulation of
private use of public streets. 5 These cases all concerned private
individuals conducting business on opened streets, not unopened ones.
In dictum, the court also discussed the rights of abutting property
owners. It limited these rights to access, light, air, water, and certain
temporary or nonexclusive uses of the street easement.'51 It further
indicated an abutting property owner has no right to use the street
abutting its property exclusively, regardless of whether the use interferes
with any actual or proposed public use of the street.'52 Although the
actual holding of the case solely addressed an abutting landowner's lack
of right to construct permanent commercial structures on street
easements and a city's right to regulate this extraordinary use in any
manner it chooses,'5 3 subsequent cases have expanded the Baxter-
Wyckoffdecision beyond this holding. 4
2. The Expansion ofBaxter-Wyckoff To Prohibit Any Use of
Unopened Public Street Easements by Abutting Owners
Subsequent cases have relied on Baxter- Wyckoff for the proposition
that a city may regulate any use of a city street, and that any regulation is
149. Id. at 562, 408 P.2d at 1017.
150. Id. at 560, 408 P.2d at 1015-16 (citing MeGlothern v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 331, 335,
199 P. 457, 458 (1921) (holding that regulating jitney buses on public streets permitted); State v.
City of Spokane, 109 Wash. 360, 364-65, 186 P. 864, 866 (1920) (holding that regulating jitney
buses by ordinance not precluded by state code); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 662-63, 168 P.
516, 517-18 (1917) (holding that regulating taxicabs on public streets permitted); Allen v. City of
Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 35, 163 P. 18, 26 (1917) (holding that regulating jitney busses permitted)).
151. Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. 2d at 562, 408 P.2d at 1016-17.
152. Id. at 561,408 P.2d at 1016.
153. Id. at 561-62, 408 P.2d at 1016-17.
154. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Broadview Television Co., 91 Wash. 2d 3,586
P.2d 851 (1978); City of Seattle v. Samis Land Co., 55 Wash. App. 554, 779 P.2d 277 (1989). Part
of the confusion surrounding subsequent applications of Baxter- Wyckoffmight arise from its first
headnote, which states "abutting property owners [do not] have any inherent right to have the
exclusive private use of, or to maintain permanent structures on, any area dedicated as a public
street." Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. 2d at 555. This headnote implies that the case overruled Nystrand
by prohibiting all private use of unopened streets. However, Baxter- Wyckoffdoes not address this
issue and discusses only permanent use. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing
confusion surrounding "so use" language in Baxter-Wycko..
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"entirely within the discretion of the city council." '155 Under these cases,
whether the street is opened or unopened does not affect the city's
regulatory authority.'56 In addition, these cases do not distinguish
whether the use regulated is permanent or non-permanent, commercial or
non-commercial.'57 Instead, such cases cite to Baxter-Wyckoff for the
general proposition that a municipality or governmental agency may
regulate any use of any opened or unopened street.
For example, in Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1 v.
Broadview Television Co.,'58 the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed
its holding in Baxter- Wyckoff.159 It noted "there is no inherent right in a
private individual to conduct private business in the public streets.'
60
The court called the right to use a street "a mere privilege, which the city
could grant or withhold," and focused on the absolute right of the state
and cities to control streets.16' Although Broadview concerned private use
of public utility poles, rather than an unopened street easement, the
Washington Supreme Court found the factual differences between
Baxter-Wyckoff and Broadview immaterial and instead focused on the
government's authority to regulate use. 6 By extending Baxter- Wyckoff
to the use of public utility poles, the court focused on the general right to
regulate public streets, rather than the type of use regulated.
163
In City of Seattle v. Samis Land Co., 64 the Washington Court of
Appeals held that the city could regulate any commercial use of an
155. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wash. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 545,556,741 P.2d 1I,
17 (1987) (citing Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. 2d at 562,408 P.2d at 1016); Broadview Television, 91
Wash. 2d at 11,586 P.2d at 856.
156. Most cases citing Baxter-Wyckoffinvolved opened streets. E.g., Bd. of Regents, 108 Wash.
2d at 555, 741 P.2d at 17; Broadview Television, 91 Wash. 2d at 11, 586 P.2d at 856. But see
Sandpiper Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Gaylard, No. 41746-1-I, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 383, at *3
(Mar. 1, 1999) (unopened street).
157. Samis, 55 Wash. App. at 557, 779 P.2d at 278-79 (involving permanent structure); City of
Seattle v. P.B. Inv. Co., 11 Wash. App. 653, 524 P.2d 419 (1974) (same). But see Sandpiper, 1999
Wash. App. LEXIS 383, at *3 (involving non-permanent structures).
158. 91 Wash. 2d 3, 586 P.2d 851 (1978).
159. Id. at 10, 586 P.2d at 856.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 10-11, 586 P.2d at 856 ("The state, and the city as an arm of the state, has absolute
control of the streets in the interest of the general public. No private individual ... has a right to the
use of the streets ... without the consent of the state.") (quoting Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657,
660, 168 P. 516,517 (1917)).
162. Id. (tracing authority to Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 660, 168 P. 516, 517 (1917)).
163. Id.
164. 55 Wash. App. 554,779 P.2d 277 (1989).
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opened street easement by an abutting landowner.165 Samis, a property-
development company, owned several buildings that extended out
underneath opened public street easements. 6 6 The city, relying on its
authority to regulate such uses, imposed a fee for this permanent use,
which Samis refused to pay.167 Samis argued that as the underlying fee
holder to the street, the city should not charge Samis for de minimis,
non-interfering use of the easement. 68 Citing Baxter-Wyckoff the court
held the city had the authority to regulate and charge fees for any type of
use. 69 The court further held that an underlying landowner's use need
not interfere with the public's use because the city could regulate any
use. 70 The City of Seattle and other municipalities have construed this
holding to justify land use ordinances restricting any use of unopened
public street easements by the underlying fee owner.'
7
'
C. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Abutting Landowner's Use of
Unopened Public Street Easements Embody the Conflict Between
the Nystrand Rule and the Expansion of the Baxter-Wyckoff
Doctrine
Using Baxter-Wyckoffand Samis as support, some cities have enacted
ordinances that restrict any use of an unopened public street easement by
abutting landowners. The cities of Seattle and Bellevue, among others,
prohibit any use of unopened streets without permission.'72 For example,
SMC section 15.02.100, enacted in 1995, prohibits activities on
unopened public street easements without a permit.77 The prohibited
activities include erecting fencing, storing material, planting trees or
165. Id. at 557, 779 P.2d at 278-79.
166. Id. at 556, 779 P.2d at 278.
167. Id. at 555-56, 779 P.2d at 278.
168. Id. at 557, 779 P.2d at 278.
169. Id. at 559-60, 779 P.2d at 280.
170. Id. at 560, 779 P.2d at 280. Baxter-Wyckoffs headnotes might have caused this interpre-
tation. See supra note 154.
171. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 15.02 (1998) (citing Samis for proposition that
Seattle has authority to charge fees for permission to occupy portion of public street for private use).
This general provision provides the authority for chapter 15.02, which includes SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUNICIPAL CODE section 15.02.100 (barring "use" of unopened street without permit, as defined by
section 15.02.046).
172. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.02.100; BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE
§14.30.070 (1998).
173. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.02.100 (regulating all "use" of "public
places").
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shrubs, or disturbing the surface without a permit. 4 This ordinance
explicitly relies on Samis, which authorizes municipal regulation.175
While this ordinance appears consistent with the holdings in the Baxter-
Wyckoff line of cases, it conflicts with the Washington court decisions
that allow abutting landowners to make reasonable non-interfering use of
unopened street easements.
76
Other cities, such as Vancouver and Everett, do not restrict all use of
unopened public street easements; instead, they are consistent with the
Nystrand reasonable-use model. 7 7 Vancouver regulates only "improve-
ments" in areas "legally open to the public use," such as streets,
sidewalks, roadways, and alleys. 7 Everett's ordinance does not restrict
any use of unopened public street easements for parking, landscaping, or
single-family uses that "will not interfere with the public convenience or
the health, safety or welfare of the general public."1
79
Ill. WASHINGTON CASE LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT
REASONABLE, NON-PERMANENT USES OF UNOPENED
PUBLIC STREET EASEMENTS BY ABUTTING
LANDOWNERS
On their facts, Baxter- Wyckoffand Samis both address permanent use
of public streets. Neither case actually supports regulating non-
interfering reasonable uses of an unopened public street easement by
abutting landowners. This Comment argues that language in the Baxter-
Wyckoff decision centers on permanent use and that the Samis court
misapplied this language, creating confusion about the rights of abutting
landowners. Seattle's use of Samis to support its regulation of all uses of
unopened public street easements exemplifies this confusion. Further-
more, because the Nystrand line of reasonable-use cases remains good
law and unequivocally speaks to non-interfering uses of unopened public
174. See id. § 15.02.048 (defining "public place" in section 15.02.046 as street or right of way,
whether opened and improved or not).
175. See1d. ch. 15.02.
176. See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
177. See VANCOUVER, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 11.60.010, .050 (1998); EVERETT, WASH.,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.30.040 (1998).
178. See VANCOUVER, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 11.60.010 (defining public street), .050
(setting forth activities on rights of way that require permit).
179. EVERETt, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.30.040(A)(2) (requiring permits but not fees for
use of right of way by abutting owners), § 13.84.010 (defining right of way to not include unopened
and unimproved street easements).
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street easements, a reasonable-use model should apply. Properly limited
to their facts, neither Baxter-Wyckoff nor Samis conflicts with this
standard. Additionally, although case law clearly suggests that a city may
comprehensively regulate opened street easements, case law does not
support prohibiting abutting owners from non-interfering use of
unopened public street easements. Thus, municipalities such as Seattle
should not prohibit or limit non-interfering reasonable use of unopened
street easements by abutting landowners, and instead should encourage
the efficient use of urban land.
A. Ordinances Such as SMC Section 15.02.100 Should Not Rely on
Samis To Restrict Use by Abutting Owners
Washington case law does not support SMC section 15.02.100
because the Seattle ordinance regulates all use of unopened public street
easements by abutting landowners regardless of the nature of that use. 8 '
Samis, the case purportedly providing explicit support for the Seattle
ordinance, only addresses the regulation of permanent use of opened
streets.' 8' Likewise, Baxter-Wyckoff does not support a city prohibiting
all uses of an unopened public street easement because Baxter-Wyckoff
dealt with permanent commercial use of an unopened public street
easement.
1. Samis Provides No Authority for SMC Section 15.02.100 Because
the Samis Court Erroneously Interpreted the Washington State
Supreme Court's Holding in Baxter-Wyckoff
Decisions relying on Baxter-Wyckoff mistakenly conflate the
permanent and non-interfering use of public street easements. 82
Furthermore, Samis concerned permanent use of opened streets and did
not address unopened street easements. The Samis court determined only
that a Washington statute allowed cities to regulate permanent
encroachments under sidewalks.'83 Because sidewalks are opened public
street easements, Samis does not hold that a city may regulate any use of
180. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.02.046 (defining "public place"), .048
(defining "use").
181. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 137-69 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Samis Land Co., 55 Wash. App. 554, 556-67, 779 P.2d 277, 278
(1989).
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an unopened public street easement. The court's analysis centered on
whether Samis's use of the public street easement needed to interfere
with the public's use of the easement for the city to regulate the use."84
Citing to Baxter-Wyckoff, the court concluded that there did not need to
be interference with the public's use to allow municipal regulation. 8"
However, the Samis court misinterpreted dictum from Baxter-
Wyckoff.'86 The Samis court quoted Baxter- Wyckoff for the proposition
that "the lack of right of the abutting owner to so use the street... does
not depend on his interference with an actual or proposed public use of
the street."' 87 The court emphasized the language "lack of right" instead
of the words "so use" in the quoted passage. This emphasis is important
because "so use"' in Baxter-Wyckoff specifically referred to the
permanent use of the street. 88 By taking this dictum out of context,
Samis employed the proposition of no use incorrectly. This mis-
interpretation dramatically changes the Baxter-Wyckoff holding from
prohibiting permanent commercial use of easements to prohibiting any
use of easements. Moreover, Baxter- Wyckoffand other decisions simply
do not support prohibiting abutting owners from making reasonable non-
permanent use of an unopened public street easement. 8 9 By incorrectly
applying Baxter-Wyckoff and expanding its holding to all uses of street
easements, the Samis court grossly misinterpreted Baxter-Wyckoff. To
the extent that cities such as Seattle use Samis as a foundation for
ordinances restricting use of unopened public street easements by
abutting landowners, their validity is specious.
184. Id. at 561, 779 P.2d at 281.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 559-60, 779 P.2d at 279-80 (citing Baxter-Wyckoff v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d
555, 561,408 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1965)).
187. Samis, 55 Wash. App. at 559-60, 779 P.2d at 280 (quoting Baxter-Wyckoff v. City of
Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555,561,408 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1965)).
188. Baxter-Wyckoffv. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555,561,408 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1965). "The
rule applies particularly to exclusive private use of the street and the construction and maintenance
of permanent structures." Id.
189. For the purposes of this Comment, a "non-permanent" use is a long term use by an abutting
owner that cannot lead to equitable estoppel.
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2. Baxter-Wyckoff Addresses Only the Regulation ofPermanent Uses
of Unopened Public Street Easements, Not Reasonable Non-
Permanent Uses by Abutting Landowners
Baxter-Wyckoff did not address an abutting landowner's non-
interfering and non-permanent use of an unopened street easement;
instead, it centered on the permanent use of an unopened street
easement. 9 ' The court expressly stated that the only issue it was con-
sidering was whether "Respondent's [Baxter-Wyckoff and Nettleton's]
Permanent Encroachments Are Inconsistent with the Public's Easement
for Travel in Southwest Florida Street."'' The court concluded "there is
no inherent right in a private individual to conduct private business in the
public streets."' 92 It also emphasized that permitting the construction of
permanent buildings in the street "is so unusual, and beyond the ordinary
authority and power of a municipality" that enabling state legislation is
needed for the city to permit such use.' 93
Baxter-Wyckoff was unique because it involved an abutting owner's
permanent use of a public street easement, a use that could have led to
equitable estoppel.' In Baxter- Wyckoff the mills constructed numerous
permanent buildings and structures in the unopened street.' It was likely
the concern of the court that by not allowing the city to regulate this
extremely unusual use, the city might be estopped from later opening the
easement.196 Because equitable estoppel may extinguish an easement,
cities may restrict permanent use on unopened streets.' 97 While the
permanent use of an unopened easement can affect the city's rights, an
190. Id. (holding that use of street by abutting owners for permanent structures is so unusual that
it may be regulated regardless whether it interferes with public).
191. Id. at 559, 408 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 560, 408 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 561,408 P.2d at 1016.
194. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing equitable estoppel).
195. Baxter-Wycko, 67 Wash. 2d at 566-57, 408 P.2d at 1013-14.
196. The issue of equitable estoppel arose in two decisions shortly after the Baxter-Wyckoff
decision. See Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 171, 443 P.2d 833, 839-40 (1968); City of
Seattle v. P.B. Inv. Co., 11 Wash. App. 653, 663, 524 P.2d 419, 426 (1974).
197. See Town of W. Seattle v. W. Seattle Land & Improvement Co., 38 Wash. 359, 364, 80 P.
549, 550-51 (1905). The concern of equitable estoppel is implicit rather than explicit in Baxter-
Wyckoff. Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. App. at 560-62, 408 P.2d at 1015-17. Throughout its discus-
sion, the Baxter-Wyckoff court talked about the unique nature of the use at issue, and implied that
equitable estoppel was a concern. Id. At one point, the court cited West Seattle Land, 38 Wash. at
364, 80 P. at 550-51, a leading Washington case on equitable estoppel and adverse possession,
concerning permanent structures. Baxter- Wyckoff, 67 Wash. App. at 561, 408 P.2d 1016.
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abutting owner's non-interfering "reasonable use" does not pose the
same threat of equitable estoppel.'9
Additionally, the language used by the court restricting an abutting
owner's rights is confusing. The court stated that the "recognized text
authorities" limit an abutting owner's rights to temporary or nonex-
clusive use of unopened street easements.1 99 The Baxter- Wyckoff court's
use of the language "temporary and non-exclusive" is distinct from
"reasonable" or "non-interfering" use.2"' The meaning intended by the
court is very specific and includes such temporally limited uses as
parking a car on an unopened street easement and unloading it, or
playing catch on the unimproved street easement.20 ' The court's use of
"temporary or nonexclusive" is distinct from "non-interfering" uses,
which would include the construction of a fence or horseshoe pit, for
example. Moreover, because the court did not distinguish "temporary
and non-exclusive" uses from "non-interfering" uses in its discussion, a
mistaken belief might arise that they are the same, when they are not.
More importantly, the recognized authorities cited by the Baxter-
Wyckoff court did not clearly support the court's dictum limiting an
abutting owner's right to use unopened street easements. McQuillin, the
treatise cited extensively as support for this proposition, relies on rules
allowing regulation of opened streets, not unopened ones.202 This
omission resulted in a conflation by the Washington Supreme Court of
opened and unopened streets that is troubling. In fact, Antieau, cited by
the court as support along with McQuillin, does at times distinguish
between opened and unopened streets. It is in its discussion of an
abutting owner's rights to an opened street that the Antieau treatise
restricts use to temporary obstructions of streets, and access, light, air,
198. Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397,407-08,367 P.2d 798, 803 (1962).
199. Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash. 2d at 562,408 P.2d at 1016-17 (citing EUGENE A. MCQUILLN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 647-56 (3d ed. 1949), and CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW 606, 622 (1955)).
200. Id. at 562, 408 P.2d at 1016-17.
201. See, e.g., Gabrielsen v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash. 157, 168-69, 272 P. 723, 727 (1928)
(recognizing deposit of building materials, machinery, and equipment on street, necessary for
construction of abutting building as temporary); see also IOA MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 356
(listing temporary uses).
202. 10A MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 356-57. The court's use of McQuillin is inappropriate
because the quoted portion focuses on the right to use opened streets and streets in general. Id.
McQuillin's discussion of abutting owner's rights focuses on use of the street and sidewalk (discus-
sing awnings, signs, steps, and other encroachments found on opened streets). In addition, the
Baxter-Wyckoff court ignores non-permanent use in its brief discussion. Baxter-Wyckoff, 67 Wash.
2d at 561, 408 P.2d at 1016-17.
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and view.2 °3 However, Antieau also discusses reasonable use, stating
that, "when an abutter owns the fee he can use the property in the street
in any way not interfering with the public easement., 2 04 Antieau's
discussion contradicts the Baxter- Wyckoff court's assertion that abutting
owner's rights are limited to access, light, air, water, view, and
temporary uses.205 Further, the most recent edition of Antieau on Local
Government Law reaffirms the right of an abutting owner to use a street
area so long as it does not interfere with the public's use.206 Prior and
subsequent cases allowing abutting owners to make non-interfering
reasonable use of unopened public street easements expose the
vulnerability of the Baxter-Wyckoff court's dictum.20 7 Yet, this dictum
has led some municipalities to believe that abutting landowners have no
right to use unopened streets for any purpose in any circumstances.0 8
However, on close analysis, neither the holding, underlying purpose, nor
dictum of Baxter-Wyckoff suggests a city may prohibit an abutting
owner's reasonable non-interfering use of an unopened public street
easement.
B. Reasonable Nonpermanent Use ofan Unopened Public Street
Easement by Abutting Owners Is Consistent with Prior Case Law
By requiring abutting landowners to seek permission to use unopened
easements in any manner, SMC section 15.02.100 ignores Nystrand and
other Washington case law allowing abutting landowners to use the
unopened street as long as it does not interfere with the city's use.20 9 The
203. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 50-53 (Student ed. 1956).
204. Id. at 52.
205. Baxter-Wyckoff 67 Wash. 2d at 562, 408 P.2d at 1016-17.
206. 2 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 30-82 (2d ed. 2000).
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.02.100 (1998); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY
CODE § 14.30.080 (1998).
209. See supra Part II.A. The legislature may delegate the authority to regulate streets to cities
through enabling legislation. See State ex rel York v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d 891,
898, 184 P.2d 577, 582 (1947); see also I OA MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 301-02. As an enabling
statute, WASH. REV. CODE section 35.22.280(7) (2000) comes closest to providing a basis for SMC
section 15.02.100. However, the language of that statute focuses on the rights of cities to "lay out
[and] establish ... streets ... and to regulate the use thereof," not on regulating unopened streets.
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280(7). The statute does not authorize regulation before laying out or
establishing a street, and courts have never interpreted it to apply to non-permanent use in unopened
streets. Therefore, if the sole authority for SMC section 15.02.100 is Samis, there may be no legal
basis for section 15.02.100. The courts have not addressed whether Washington Revised Code
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Nystrand line of cases remains good law and holds that abutting
landowners may make reasonable use of an unopened public street
easement in any manner not inconsistent with public street easements or
neighboring owner's access.210 In Nystrand, the court stated that the
O'Malleys' use of the unopened street, in extending their garage onto the
unopened easement, planting trees and a hedge, and constructing a
bulkhead, "was not inconsistent with the public's easement since the
right to open the street for the public's use had not been asserted by the
city.""21 Thus, the use by the abutting landowner did not interfere with
the city's use of the easement, satisfying the first part of the Nystrand
test. Furthermore, the landowner's use of the unopened public street
easement did not interfere with the neighboring owners' access,
satisfying the second part of the test.212 By satisfying both prongs of the
test, the O'Malleys' use was permitted.2"3
The foundation of this reasonable-use principle is Colegrove Water
Co. v. City of Hollywood,214 consistently cited by the Washington
Supreme Court to support the proposition that abutting landowners may
reasonably use unopened public street easements, so long as the use does
not interfere with the public's full enjoyment of the easement.215 In
Colegrove, the California Supreme Court held that as long as the use by
an abutting landowner of the street did not interfere with the public's
rights, it was permissible. 6 This holding was endorsed by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in 1911, when it adopted this rule and decided that
an abutting landowner could construct a ditch in the unopened portion of
the abutting public street.217 Likewise, in Lanham v. Forney218 the court
permitted reasonable use by abutting landowners, where the abutting
section 35.22.280(7) may in fact provide support for regulation of all uses of unopened public street
easements. This issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
210. See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
211. Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792,795,375 P.2d 863, 865 (1962).
212 Id.
213. Id.
214. 90 P. 1053 (Cal. 1907).
215. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text; see also State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
28 Wash. 2d 891, 902, 184 P.2d 577, 584 (1947); City of Raymond v. Willapa Power Co., 102
Wash. 278,281, 172 P. 1176, 1177 (1918) (citing Colegrove, 90 P. at 1055).
216. Colegrove, 90 P. at 1055.
217. Holm v. Montgomery, 62 Wash. 398, 399, 113 P. 1115,1116 (1911).
218. 196 Wash. 62, 81 P.2d 777 (1938).
Washington Law Review
landowner had installed a pipe under what later became an opened street,
and two city officials sued to enjoin its use.219
Since the Washington Supreme Court adopted Colegrove, it has
consistently allowed abutting owners to make use of the land subject to
the public easement where such use is not inconsistent with that
easement.12' These cases are consistent with Nystrand's approach of
allowing reasonable use by abutting landowners. For example, the court
in Thompson v. Smith22' permitted reasonable use by the abutting land-
owner until that use interfered with the opening of the street easement.
222
The Washington Court of Appeals recently followed Thompson's rule of
reasonable use in Meresse v. Stelma 3 where it determined that an
abutting landowner could reasonably use a private street while
unopened. 24 Thus, Washington still adheres to the reasonable-use
standard for unopened and unimproved public street easements.
C. Cities May Not Prohibit the Non-Permanent Reasonable Use of
Unopened Public Street Easements
Washington cases have repeatedly held that public easements do not
convey complete control over the property dedicated. In fact, Antieau,
one of the treatises cited by the Baxter- Wyckoff court, states that fee
owners may use their fee so long as their use does not interfere with the
municipality's use. 25 If the municipality is not using the easement,
reasonable use by an abutting owner cannot interfere with the city's
rights to the easement. Additionally, a long line of Washington decisions
supports limiting the scope of public street easements by restricting the
rights of the public easement holder to uses connected with trans-
portation and commerce. 226 This limitation arises because an easement
dedication grants only limited rights to use the land, not fee ownership.
219. Id. at 66, 81 P. 2d. at 779.
220. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d at 902, 184 P.2d at 584 (listing cases
permitting non-interfering use of easement); see also Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397,407-08,
367 P.2d 798, 803 (1962).
221. 59 Wash. 2d 397, 367 P.2d 798 (1962).
222. Id. at 407-08, 367 P.2d at 803.
223. 100 Wash. App. 857, 999 P.2d 1267 (2000).
224. Id. at 867-68, 999 P.2d at 1274.
225. 2 STEVENSON, supra note 206, at 30-82 (quoting Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792,
375 P.2d 863 (1962) in its text to support this proposition).
226. E.g., State exrel. York v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d 891, 902, 184 P.2d, 577,
584 (1947); Motoramp Garage Co. v. City of Tacoma, 136 Wash. 589, 591, 241 P. 16 (1925).
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Generally, Washington courts have not held that municipalities and
counties have anything more than an easement of use in public streets.227
The only right a municipality or county acquires from the easement is the
right to use the land for a public street.228 Nystrand and Thompson
support this proposition that a public street easement does not convey
unlimited control over the property dedicated.229 If the public has not
asserted the easement by opening it, then reasonable use by an abutting
landowner is consistent with the public's present and future rights to use
the easement. 30
Consider under Thompson a situation in which a private easement
holder, who had yet to assert the easement by opening it, put up a sign
stating: "The fee holder may not use this land except for access without
my permission." A court would conclude that this attempt to prevent an
abutting landowner's reasonable use was improper because the easement
holder had not begun to use the easement.231 Likewise, following
Nystrand, to exercise direct control over the easement, the city or county
must assert its rights by opening the easement. 2 Merely placing a sign at
the beginning of the easement, or regulating the easement by enacting a
statute, does not open it. The hypothetical situation above would also
apply to public easements because the easement conveys to a city or
county the right to open a street. To hold otherwise, prohibiting
reasonable non-interfering uses by abutting landowners, would essen-
tially equate dedication of an easement with conveyance of fee title
ownership.
Therefore, it is contradictory to allow municipalities and counties to
act as owners by effectively precluding abutting landowners from
making any non-interfering use of the land over which the easement
runs. 1 3 Additionally, these regulations effectively preclude landowners
227. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d at 898, 184 P.2d at 582 ("[N]ormally, the
interest acquired by the public is but an easement."); Erickson Bushling Inc. v. Manke Lumber Co.,
77 Wash. App. 495, 498, 891 P.2d 750, 752 (1995) ("[W]hen land is dedicated to the public for a
street or road, the public acquires only an easement.").
228. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161,168,443 P.2d 833,838 (1968) (holding that only right
acquired by municipality was easement for passage and use for street purposes).
229. Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wash. 2d 792, 795, 375 P.2d 863, 865 (1962); Thompson v.
Smith, 59 Wash. 2d 397, 407-08, 367 P.2d 798, 803 (1962).
230. See Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795,375 P.2d at 865.
231. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
232. See Nystrand, 60 Wash. 2d at 795, 375 P.2d at 865.
233. Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267, 270, 128 P. 539, 540-41 (1912) ("We have uniformly held
that a city acquires only an easement in a street in consequence of a dedication.").
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from challenging the city because the cost to litigate these rights is
prohibitive. In this manner, municipal regulations that prohibit use by
abutting owners remain unchallenged.
D. Public Policy Favors Permitting Abutting Landowners Non-
Permanent Reasonable Use of Unopened Public Street Easements
Restricting abutting landowners' reasonable non-interfering use of
unopened public street easements prevents the efficient use of land.
Municipalities regulate opened streets primarily to ensure public
safety.234 Municipalities may seek to regulate unopened public street
easements for similar reasons. However, cities are not liable for injuries
on unimproved (and unopened) public street easements. 3s Therefore, the
need to regulate these unopened streets is minimal. If the city or county
has not asserted the easement by opening it, the public is not using the
street and the need to protect the public through regulation diminishes. 36
Municipal restrictions that prohibit non-interfering reasonable use by
abutting landowners furthers waste. When an abutting landowner uses an
unopened street easement to store firewood, establish a dog run, or
simply to extend a backyard, the fee owner enjoys this previously unused
land. Restricting this reasonable use by the abutting landowner serves no
benefit, except to increase revenue for municipalities. 7
Furthermore, many unopened street easements were dedicated in the
1920s and 1930s and lie over terrain where it is impossible to build a
street. Abutting landowners should be able to make non-interfering
reasonable use of this marginal land until the city or county needs it.
Such use leads to an efficient utilization of resources. Consequently,
abutting landowners should have rights of reasonable non-interfering use
to the unopened public street easements abutting their property.
234. 10A MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 332.
235. Barton v. King County, 18 Wash. 2d 573, 575, 139 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1943) (holding that
"municipality is not liable for injuries sustained outside the improved portion of the street or
highway").
236. Id.; see also IOA MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at 332.
237. However, regulating non-interfering land use as a revenue source is suspect. See Baxter-
Wyckoff v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555, 564-67, 408 P.2d 1012, 1018-19 (1965) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting) (focusing on whether fees relate to cost of administration, or instead are revenue raising).
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CONCLUSION
Reasonable, non-interfering use of unopened public street easements
by abutting landowners should be exempt from prohibitions on use and
fees by municipalities. Neither Baxter-Wyckoff nor Samis addresses
reasonable non-interfering use of an unopened street easement. If courts
and lawmakers properly confine Baxter- yckoffand Samis to their facts
and holdings, these cases do not actually conflict with the Nystrand line
of decisions. Accordingly, ordinances such as Seattle Municipal Code
section 15.02.100 should not rely on Samis to support restricting abutting
landowners' reasonable non-interfering use of unopened public street
easements because Samis applies to neither unopened street easements
nor non-interfering use of these easements. Further, the Nystrand line,
which explicitly addresses abutting landowner's use of unopened public
street easements, does not support such restrictions; instead, these cases
permit reasonable non-interfering use. If the use by the abutting
landowner does not interfere with the city's potential use of the
easement, or neighboring owners' rights of access, then the use is
reasonable. Finally, as land in Seattle neighborhoods such as Queen
Anne and Magnolia becomes both more valuable and exceptionally
scarce, the desire and need to use this land will increase. Thus, abutting
landowners should have the right to reasonable non-interfering use of
unopened public street easements.
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